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Abstract
Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1989 to 1999, we examine the impact of
family cap policies, which deny incremental welfare benefits, on out-of-wedlock birth rates.  We use
the first five states that were granted waivers from the Department of Health and Human Services
to implement family caps as “natural experiments.”  Specifically, we compare trends in out-of-
wedlock birth rates in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia to trends in states that
did not implement family caps or any other waivers prior to the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).  We employ several techniques to increase the
credibility of results from our “natural experiment,” such as the inclusion of multiple comparison
groups, controls for differential time trends, and “difference-in-difference-indifferences” estimators.
Our regression estimates generally do not provide evidence that family cap policies reduce the
incidence of out-of-wedlock births among single, less-educated women with children.
Keywords: Welfare, Family Caps, Fertility
JEL Classification: I3, J11. Introduction 
  On September 13, 1999, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services awarded 
Alabama, California, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Michigan each $20 million for 
achieving the largest decreases in out-of-wedlock births between 1994-95 and 1996-97.  These 
were the first awards, which will be made annually, granted as part of the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) to encourage states to 
reduce non-marital childbearing.  One of the most controversial policies that many states have 
used to combat out-of-wedlock births is the family cap or child exclusion policy, which 
eliminates the extra monetary benefits traditionally entitled to women who have additional 
children while receiving welfare.
1  Seventeen states implemented family caps as waivers to the 
federal requirements of the original Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 
and several additional states have implemented family caps since PRWORA was enacted 
(Crouse, 1999). 
Supporters of the family cap policy argue that incremental benefits encourage welfare 
recipients to have additional out-of-wedlock children, and, thus, the elimination of these benefits 
will reduce this “perverse” incentive (DHHS, 1997).  This argument is supported by the standard 
economic model of fertility, which posits that the demand for children decreases when the net 
cost of having children increases.
2  Because the removal of incremental benefits increases the net 
cost of having children, it is suggested that family cap policies will reduce fertility.  This theory, 
however, does not offer a prediction regarding the size of the effect on fertility.  For example, the 
effects may be small if many pregnancies are unplanned, incremental benefit levels are low 
relative to the perceived costs of raising children, nonpecuniary factors dominant the fertility 
decision, or expected welfare durations are short. 
                                                           
1 Prior to 1992, all states provided incremental increases to welfare benefits for additional children.  These 
monthly incremental benefits ranged from $24 to $134 in 1990. 
2See Becker (1981).    2
  Interestingly, the experimental evaluations accompanying family cap waivers in New 
Jersey and Arkansas do not provide strong evidence of a negative effect on fertility (Camasso, et 
al. 1998 and Turtora, Benda and Turney 1997).  However, these family cap evaluations have been 
criticized extensively (see Maynard, et al. 1998 for example).  In both the New Jersey and 
Arkansas experiments it was found that many of the AFDC recipients in the control group 
thought they were subject to the family cap.  The New Jersey experiment also was criticized 
because it was found that some of the AFDC recipients in the experimental group did not report 
births to welfare officials because these births did not result in increased benefits.  Non-
experimental studies of the impact of family cap policies have largely provided mixed results.  
Most of these studies, however, rely on state-level data or provide only indirect evidence on the 
effects of family caps. 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by providing evidence from the first five 
states that were granted waivers from the Department of Health and Human Services to 
implement family caps.  Using microdata from the 1989 to 1999 Current Population Survey 
(CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files, we compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates 
among single, less-educated women with children in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and 
Virginia to several sets of comparison states that did not implement family caps or any other 
waivers during our sample period, which was prior to the implementation of Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs.
3  We also compare trends in birth rates 
between groups of women who are differentially affected by family cap policies (single vs. 
married) and interact these two trends to create a "difference-in-difference-in-differences" 
estimate of the effect.  The results from our analysis of birth rates are based on the experiences of 
several states and should be less susceptible to "contamination bias" and underreporting of births 
than the experimental evaluation results.  Our econometric modeling of the birth decision at the    3
micro level, exclusion of post-TANF years, and use of less-educated married women as an 
additional control group differs from most of the non-experimental literature on family caps. 
 
2. Past Literature 
  Several recent studies have examined the impacts of family caps on fertility.  We first 
briefly examine the evidence from the experimental evaluations that accompanied family cap 
waivers in New Jersey and Arkansas.
4  In the evaluation of New Jersey's Family Development 
Program, Camasso, et al. (1998) find that birth rates among the experimental group of AFDC 
recipients who were subject to the cap fell from 11 percent in 1992-93 to six percent in 1994-95.
5  
They also find, however, that the decline in birth rates among the control group of AFDC 
recipients who were not subject to the cap was nearly identical, suggesting that the family cap had 
little impact.  The results from the evaluation of the Arkansas family cap waiver similarly indicate 
no statistical difference between trends in birth rates among the experimental and control groups 
of AFDC recipients. 
Notably, these family cap evaluations have been criticized for two main reasons.  First, in 
both the New Jersey and Arkansas experiments it was found that many of the AFDC recipients in 
the control group thought they were subject to the family cap.
6  This "contamination bias" may 
have allowed the family cap to affect the behavior of the control group making it difficult to 
identify policy effects from a comparison of trends in birth rates between the two groups.  
Second, the New Jersey experiment also was criticized because it was found that some of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 We do not include post-TANF years in the analysis period because of the substantial differences in 
welfare programs across states resulting from the implementation of TANF programs, making it difficult to 
isolate the effects of family caps. 
4 See Grogger, Karoly and Klerman (2002) for a more detailed review of the experimental evidence. 
5 New Jersey’s family cap policy was implemented as part of the state’s Family Development Program. 
6 In the evaluation of the Arkansas experiment, Turturro, Benda, and Turney (1997) note that some AFDC 
caseworkers "reported that they simply told clients that a family cap on benefits may apply to them” (p. 2).  
Maynard, et al. (1998) cite an article in the Wall Street Journal that reports survey results indicating that in 
the New Jersey experiment the control group was as likely to believe that the family cap applied to them as 
the experimental group. 
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AFDC recipients in the experimental group did not report births to welfare officials because these 
births did not result in increased benefits (see Maynard, et al. 1998 for more details).  Thus, the 
reported birth rates of the AFDC recipients subject to the family cap in New Jersey likely were 
understated. 
  In response to these concerns over the experimental design and the publicity generated by 
the controversial family cap policy, the New Jersey research team developed a quasi-
experimental design to compare actual outcomes under the Family Development Program to 
projected outcomes in the absence of the program (Camasso, et al. 1998).  Using administrative 
welfare data and Medicaid claims files from the New Jersey Department of Human Services, they 
find evidence of a significant decline in births to AFDC recipients after implementation of the 
program. 
Other non-experimental studies of the impact of family cap policies provide mixed 
results.  Horvath-Rose and Peters (2001) use state-level data from 1984 to 1996 to measure the 
impact of welfare waivers, including family caps, on the ratio of non-marital to marital births.  
Estimating fixed-effect regression models, they find that family cap policies have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the non-marital birth ratio.  Using Vital Statistics Natality Data 
from 1989 to 1998 compiled by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Kearney (2003) 
explores whether family cap policies reduce the number of births in states implementing them.  
The results from her fixed effects regressions using state-level data for log births do not provide 
evidence that family caps reduce births or additional births to women ages 15-34.  Mach (2001) 
uses matched data from the March CPS to examine the effects of family caps on fertility.  She 
finds that the fertility of welfare recipients, but not all women, is roughly 10 percent lower when 
subject to family caps.  Welfare receipt, however, may be endogenous and the use of all other 
women as a control group for studying the effects of family caps on welfare recipients may be 
problematic because the groups differ substantially in levels of education, marriage rates and 
employment rates.    5
Joyce, et al. (2003) use state-level data aggregated from induced termination of 
pregnancy files, national nativity files, and the CPS to explore the relationship between family 
caps, and birth and abortions.  They use birth and abortion rate data for 24 states over the period 
from 1992 to 1999 and employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator which 
identifies the effects of family caps from a comparison of changes over time in birth and abortion 
rates between women at risk of being affected by family caps and women not at risk of being 
affected by family caps.  They find that trends over the family cap period in birth and abortion 
rates were similar for women with previous live births (the at-risk group) and women with no 
previous live births (the not at-risk group), and conclude that the downward trend in birth rates 
and upward trend in abortion rates are not a response to family caps. 
  Several additional empirical studies provide indirect evidence on the likely impact of 
family cap policies by examining the effect of incremental AFDC benefit levels on higher-order 
births.
7  These studies use the existing variation in incremental benefit levels across states, time, 
or both to estimate the size of the effect.
8  Powers (1994), Argys and Rees (1996), and Robins and 
Fronstin (1996) find some evidence that incremental benefits have a positive effect on out-of-
wedlock birth rates.  These findings suggest that family cap policies, which reduce or eliminate 
incremental benefits, may be effective in discouraging childbearing among welfare recipients. 
However, Acs (1996), Fairlie and London (1997), and Grogger and Bronars (1996) do not find 
evidence of a positive effect of incremental benefits on fertility, thus raising doubts about the 
efficacy of family cap policies. 
The empirical evidence on the effects of family cap policies clearly is mixed.  We 
provide new evidence on the effectiveness of these policies by analyzing the birth decisions of 
                                                           
7 See Moffitt (1992, 1998) for reviews of the literature on the effect of welfare benefits on any births.  
Although these studies provide mixed results, Moffit notes that a majority of the more recent studies 
indicate that welfare benefits have a positive and statistically significant effect on fertility. 
8In addition to these national level studies, a few state level studies exist.  Keefe (1983) finds that the large 
increase in total and incremental AFDC benefits from 1970 to 1971 in California did not increase fertility    6
women found in the 1989 to 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group 
(ORG) files.  Specifically, we compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates among single, less-
educated women with children in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia to several 
sets of comparison states that did not implement family caps or any other waivers during our 
sample period.  Our analysis of birth rates differs from the experimental evaluations because it is 
based on the experiences of several states and should be less susceptible to "contamination bias" 
and underreporting of births.  Specifically, we do not distinguish between women in the 
experimental and control groups.  Instead all women living in a family cap state are considered to 
be subject to the family cap, and thus we are less concerned that welfare recipients in the control 
group thought they were subject to the family cap.  The CPS is also a household survey and 
provides no differential incentive to report or not report births between the control and 
experimental groups.  Respondents simply report the number and ages of all children currently 
living in the household. 
  Our analysis also differs from recent non-experimental studies of the effects of family 
caps in that we empirically model the birth decision at the micro level allowing us to include a 
rich set of controls for individual characteristics and precisely define the samples used for 
treatment and control groups.  To be sure, Mach (2001) also uses microdata from the CPS to 
estimate regressions for the probability of a birth, but the use of the March CPS (which is one 
third the size of the ORGs) and matching from one year to the next (which only is possible for 
less than 50 percent of respondents) results in substantially smaller sample sizes than the ORGs.
9  
The approach we use also differs from Horvath-Rose and Peters (1999) in its focus on out-of-
wedlock birth rates instead of the non-marital birth ratio and differs from Kearney (2003), Joyce, 
et al. (2003) and Mach (2001) in that we exclude post-TANF years because of concerns over the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
among recipients in the state.  Rank (1989) finds that AFDC recipients in Wisconsin have lower birth rates 
than women in the general population.    7
substantial differences in welfare programs across states resulting from the implementation of 
TANF.  We also provide separate estimates for family cap states allowing for heterogeneity in 
treatment effects, use multiple sets of control group states, and use less-educated married women 
with children and their interaction with family cap states (i.e. difference-in-difference-in-
differences) as additional control groups.
10 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
AFDC FAMILY CAP WAIVERS 
Prior to the passage of PRWORA in 1996, the Department of Health and Human Services 
was authorized to waive certain requirements of the federal AFDC program to give states the 
flexibility to experiment with policies and projects to further the goals of the AFDC program 
(DHHS, 1997).   These AFDC waivers represented the beginning of welfare reform in the 1990’s 
in that they were a response to the widely held belief that AFDC created work disincentives, 
encouraged out-of-wedlock childbearing and discouraged marriage (DHHS 1997 and Maynard et 
al, 1998).   The majority of AFDC waiver policies can be categorized as follows: family caps, 
termination/reduction time limits, changes to JOBS work exemptions, changes to JOBS 
sanctions, increases in earnings disregards, and work requirement time limits (Crouse, 1999).
11   
Out of the six major categories of waivers, family caps were the only policies designed to directly 
target childbearing incentives, and thus represent the waiver policy most likely to have an impact 
on fertility. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 The sample of welfare recipients from the 22 states implementing family caps over the period from 1989 
to 2000 includes 568 observations of which 25 experienced births in the March CPS. 
10 Joyce, et al. (2003) also use a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator, but compare changes in 
birth rates for less-educated single mothers to birth rates for less-educated single women without children.  
Identification relies on the assumptions that the birth rate differential between mothers and non-mothers is 
only affected by the family cap and that non-mothers who desire more than 1 child are not affected by the 
family cap. 
11 See DHHS (1997) for a complete description of each type of waiver. 
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The first state to implement a family cap policy was New Jersey in 1992.  In the years 
that followed, several other states implemented family cap policies either as waivers under the 
AFDC program or as part of their TANF plan. Table 1 lists all states that implemented a family 
cap policy as of 1998. 
We made the following decisions in determining which of these states to include in our 
treatment group of family cap states.  First, we addressed the issue of whether to include TANF 
years in our analysis.  TANF, which replaced AFDC in 1996, provided states with a substantial 
amount of flexibility in designing new welfare programs.  Given that TANF resulted in major 
changes to state welfare programs, isolating the effect of the family cap on fertility becomes 
increasingly difficult in post-TANF years.  Therefore, we decided to exclude post-TANF years 
from our analysis and focus on the effect of family cap policies implemented as waivers under the 
former AFDC program.   
Second, we wanted the post period (i.e. the time period following the implementation of a 
family cap AFCD waiver) to be of sufficient length for examining policy effects on birth rates.  
We examined each state’s family cap implementation date and grace period and determined that a 
good cutoff would be summer 1995, which guaranteed more than a year for the post period.  The 
first five states to implement family cap policies as AFDC waivers—Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, 
New Jersey, and Virginia—did so by this cutoff date.  These states became our treatment group.  
Other family cap states did not implement their policies until just prior to TANF, which does not 
allow a sufficient time period for examining policy effects on birth rates in these states. 
Among the five family cap states included in our analysis, the loss of monthly 
incremental benefits ranged from $42 in Arkansas to $102 in New Jersey.
12  The specific details 
of family cap policies varied somewhat across these states.   New Jersey, for example, allows 
                                                           
12 The incremental benefit is calculated as the difference between the AFDC maximum benefit for a family 
of two and the maximum benefit for a family of three.  These estimates are from the Urban Institute’s 
Assessing the New Federalism State Database at www.urbaninstitute.org and United States Congress, 
House Committee on Ways and Means (1992).    9
capped families to increase their earnings from work without experiencing a decrease in their 
current cash assistance amount (Gallagher et al, 1998).   Similarly, Virginia allows families to 
retain all child support payments for a child subject to its family cap, while Indiana provides 
vouchers for goods worth up to half of the incremental benefit increase denied (DHHS, 1997).  It 
also is important to note that most states have a 10-month grace period during which new welfare 
recipients can give birth to additional children who will not be subject to the family cap 
(Gallagher et al, 1998).  One state, Georgia, had a 24-month grace period under its family cap 
waiver. 
To be sure, four of the five states used in the following “natural experiment” – Georgia, 
Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia – also implemented other waivers under AFDC.  Indiana and 
Virginia implemented a termination or reduction time limit waiver.  Indiana, New Jersey and 
Virginia implemented changes to JOBS work exemptions, and Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and 
Virginia had waivers for JOBS sanctions.  Virginia also implemented a work requirement time 
limit and an increased earnings disregard waiver.  Finally, Indiana implemented a waiver of the 
100-hour rule of its AFDC-UP program (DHHS 1997 and Crouse 1999). 
Although these waivers may alter the opportunity costs of having children, they do not 
directly target the fertility decisions of welfare recipients, and thus are less likely to have an effect 
on out-of-wedlock births than the family cap.  In support of this assertion, Horvath-Rose and 
Peters (1999) find that the only waivers that had a consistently negative effect on the ratio of non-
marital to marital births are the family cap and AFDC-UP waivers (although only for teenagers).  
Furthermore, the waivers, with the possible exception of the increased earnings disregard waiver 
in Virginia, were generally intended to reduce AFDC caseloads, and thus should have a negative 
effect, if any, on non-marital fertility.
13  It is useful to note, however, that a major difficulty in this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
13 Horvath-Rose and Peters (1999) note that the effect of the increased earnings disregard on non-marital 
fertility is ambiguous because it both increases eligibility for welfare and increases the opportunity cost of    10
area of research is identifying the independent effects of specific waivers or TANF policies.  We 
return to this issue when we draw conclusions about our results. 
 
COMPARISON GROUP OF NON-FAMILY CAP STATES 
To examine whether the family cap policies implemented in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, 
New Jersey, and Virginia had an effect on fertility, we compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth 
rates between these five "family cap" states and states that did not implement a family cap or any 
other waiver during our sample period.  For brevity, we refer to these five states as "family cap" 
states in the analysis although four of them implemented additional waivers.  A simple approach 
is to compare mean outcomes between the treatment group (i.e. family cap states) and comparison 
group (i.e. non-family cap states) in the time period before the policy change (the pre period) and 
in the time period after the policy change (the post period).
14  Assuming that the implementation 
of family cap policies is the only factor differentially affecting fertility between the treatment and 
comparison groups, a negative "difference-in-differences" estimate implies that family cap 
policies reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates. 
To create our comparison group of non-family cap states, we considered several things.  
First, we wanted to remove the potential effects of any waivers on post-period observations.  To 
accomplish this, we identified when each non-family cap state implemented its first AFDC 
waiver.  Then we excluded observations that fell in the time period following implementation of 
any AFDC waiver.  Second, as with the treatment group of family cap states, we wanted the post 
period for each comparison state to be of sufficient length for our analysis.  We chose November 
                                                                                                                                                                             
having an additional child on welfare.  See Horvath-Rose and Peters (1999) for a thorough discussion of 
the expected effects of all AFDC waivers on non-marital childbearing. 
14 In defining the pre and post periods, we take into account each family cap state’s grace period.  Georgia, 
for example, had a 24-month grace period.  Therefore, the earliest date its family cap (implemented in 
January 1994) would have applied to a newborn is January 1996.   Since our focus is on the decision to 
have an out-of-wedlock birth, the earliest an AFDC recipient in Georgia could have decided to have an 
additional child that would be subject to the family cap is May 1995.  Thus, Georgia’s post period begins 
on May 1995. 
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1995 as the cutoff as this guaranteed that each state in the comparison group contributed at least 
one full year of post period observations.  Therefore, we excluded all states that implemented any 
AFDC waiver before November 1995.  Finally, we excluded all observations in post-TANF 
years.  In the end, the observations from our comparison group of states should be free of both 
waiver and TANF effects. 
As a result of these decisions in creating our treatment and comparison groups of states, 
the post period for each family cap state ends in the month prior to when the state implemented its 
TANF program.  The post period end date for each non-family cap state in our comparison group 
is the minimum of either the TANF implementation date or the implementation date of any 
AFDC waiver.  The post-period end date, therefore, varies by state. 
After applying the aforementioned criteria, the full comparison group consists of 28 non-
family cap states, located throughout the United States. These states are listed in Table 2.  In 
comparing out-of-wedlock birth rates between our family cap and non-family cap states, we also 
utilize more geographically restricted comparison groups that consist of subsets of states from our 
full comparison group.  These subsets are non-family cap states in the South and those in the 
Northeast. 
  Before proceeding with the analysis of trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates, it is useful to 
compare trends in a few alternative factors that may have differentially affected fertility between 
family cap and non-family cap states.  In Table 2, we report AFDC maximum benefit levels, 
abortion providers, and unemployment rates for the years 1992 and 1996 for each state in our 
analysis.  These years roughly correspond to the periods before and after the implementation of 
family cap policies in our five states.  Large differences in the trends in these variables across 
states could contribute to differential trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates between family cap 
states and non-family cap states. 
Interestingly, the trends in AFDC benefit levels were very similar across the included 
states.  In fact, all five family cap states and 11 non-family cap states had essentially the same    12
decline in maximum benefit levels for a family of three.
15  Almost all other comparison states 
experienced declines in AFDC benefit levels from 1992 to 1996 of a similar magnitude.  
Oklahoma experienced a decline of 20 percent, while Kentucky and New Mexico experienced an 
increase in AFDC benefit levels from 1992 to 1996.  Other than these exceptions, the trends in 
AFDC benefit levels did not differ substantially between the family cap and non-family cap 
states.  For a more formal test, we also regressed AFDC benefit levels on state fixed effects, a 
dummy for 1996, and an interaction between family cap states and 1996.  The coefficient 
estimate on the family cap state and 1996 interaction is small and statistically insignificant. 
Most states experienced large decreases in the number of abortion providers from 1992 to 
1996.
16  More importantly for this analysis, however, is that the declines in the number of 
abortion providers among family cap states were comparable to the declines in most non-family 
cap states.  The main exception was New Jersey, which experienced an increase of six abortion 
providers from 1992 to 1996.  This may have an effect on trends in out-of-wedlock births in New 
Jersey or be the result of these trends.  Finally, changes in economic conditions (as measured by 
unemployment rates) from 1992 to 1996 in the family cap states did not differ substantially from 
those in non-family cap states.  Unemployment rates generally declined substantially between 
these two years.
17 
Overall, trends in AFDC benefit levels, abortion providers, and unemployment rates were 
fairly comparable between family cap and non-family cap states.  This is important because 
glaring differences in these trends could signal that our choice of a comparison group is 
inappropriate. 
 
                                                           
15 The 11 percent decline in these states was due to constant nominal benefit levels between 1992 and 1996 
and an increase in the CPI of 11 percent. 
16 Unfortunately, we do not have statistics on the size of providers. 
17 We also find small and statistically insignificant coefficients on a family cap state - 1996 interaction in 
regressions for abortion providers and unemployment rates. 
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ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
  In Section 4, we first compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates in Arkansas, Georgia, 
Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia to trends in states that did not implement family caps or any 
other waivers prior to PRWORA.  Although a comparison of these trends may be informative, it 
will not control for the potential effects of differential trends in demographic characteristics.  To 
control for these factors, we estimate equations for the probability of a birth using our sample of 
single, less-educated women with children.  Formally, we assume that fertility is determined by 
an unobserved latent variable 
(2.1)  Bist
* = µs + γt +φ'Pst + δ'Fs*Pst + β'Xist + εist, 
where Fs is a dummy variable indicating a family cap state, Pst is a dummy variable indicating a 
post-family cap time period observation, Xist is a vector of individual characteristics, µs is a fixed 
effect for state s, γt is a fixed effect for year t, and εist is the disturbance term.
18  Only the 
dichotomous variable, Bist, is observed, however.  It equals 1 if Bist
* ≥0 (denoting that a birth 
occurred in the previous year) and equals 0 otherwise (denoting no birth).  If we take εist to be 
normally distributed, the assumptions imply that the data are described by a probit model.  
Although the normality assumption should only be taken as an approximation, the probit model 
provides a useful descriptive model for the binary event that a birth occurred.  We also adjust the 
standard errors for the presence of common random shocks at the state level to address concerns 
regarding understated standard errors and serially correlated outcomes for the U.S. grouped 
regressions (see Betrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2002).  For the other specifications, where we 
do not have a large enough number of groups, we estimate heteroscedasticity-robust (i.e. Huber-
White) standard errors. 
                                                           
18 Note that the "main" effect for family cap states, Fs, is captured by the state fixed effects, but that the 
"main" effect for the post period, Pst, is not captured by the year fixed effects because it is determined by 
the month of implementation. 
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  In Equation (2.1), the effectiveness of the family cap policy is determined by examining 
the sign and statistical significance of δ.
19  A negative and statistically significant estimate of δ 
provides evidence that family cap policies reduce the birth rate among single, less educated 
women with children.  We can also examine the robustness of this estimate by selecting several 
different treatment and comparison states. 
  A potential concern with this interpretation of δ is that there may have existed differential 
trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates between the family cap and comparison states that began 
before the implementation of family cap policies.  For example, a negative estimate of δ may 
simply be due to a more rapid downward trend over the past decade in the out-of-wedlock birth 
rate in the family cap states than in the non-family cap states.  To control for this potential bias, 
we also estimate probit regressions that include a separate linear time trend, t, for the family cap 
states 
(2.2)  Bist
* = µs + γt + φ'Pst + λ'tt* Fs + δ'Fs*Pst + β'Xist + εist. 
  Another approach to examining the effectiveness of the family cap policy is to compare 
trends in birth rates between single, less-educated women with children and married, less-
educated women with children within family cap states.  These married women theoretically 
should not be affected (or at least only minimally affected) by family cap policies because they 
are not typically eligible to receive AFDC benefits, but may be affected similarly by other factors 
affecting fertility among low-income women.
20  Therefore, we use married, less-educated women 
with children as a comparison group and restrict our sample to only family cap states.  The 
equation is 
(2.3)  Bist
* = µs + γt + φ1'Pst + φ2'Sist + δ'Sist*Pst + β'Xist + εist, 
                                                           
19 We are implicitly assuming that the effects of family caps are immediate and do not evolve over time.  
Although there may exist spillover effects or incomplete information regarding the policies implying larger 
effects over time, our approach represents an approximation to this dynamic process. 
20 Married women are eligible for welfare benefits through the AFDC-UP program.  However, only seven 
percent of all families on AFDC receive benefits through the AFDC-UP program (United States Congress, 
House Committee on Ways and Means, 1992).    15
where Sist is a dummy variable indicating that the woman is single.  Again, in this equation a 
negative and statistically significant estimate of δ provides evidence that family caps reduce out-
of-wedlock births. 
  A combination of the identification strategies used in Equations (2.1) and (2.3) suggests 
that the family cap should only (or at least largely) affect the fertility decisions of single women 
with children who live in family cap states during the post-family cap period.  Therefore, an 
additional estimation strategy is the "difference-in-difference-in-differences" estimator 
(2.4)Bist
* = µs+ γt + φ1'Pst + φ2'Sist + α1'Sist*Fs + α2'Sist*Pst + α3'Fs*Pst + δ'Sist*Fs*Pst + β'Xist + εist. 
In this specification, identification of δ comes from comparing the change over time in the 
difference between the birth rates of single and married women in family cap states to the change 
over time in the difference between the birth rates in non-family cap states.  The use of this and 
the previous alternative approaches of specifying the natural experiment provide additional 
evidence for testing the hypothesis. 
  
3. Data 
We use data from the 1989 to 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation 
Group (ORG) files.  The ORG files contain annual samples that are roughly three times larger 
than those from a monthly CPS, such as the commonly used March Annual Demographic Files.  
The large sample sizes are important for identifying the potential effects of family caps.  Also, the 
CPS microdata provide detailed demographic information on the mother to include as controls in 
the regressions and allow us to estimate models for the probability of birth because they include 
observations for women not giving birth in the previous year. 
We create our sample by first matching mothers to their children.  The CPS assigns each 
household an identification number (which is made unique within each year by affixing the 
month and state variables to this number), and each individual within a household is assigned a 
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unique identifier number.   These variables are used in conjunction with spouse and parent 
identifiers and the edited relationship to household head variable to match mothers to their 
children.  Because the CPS collects individual information by household, it is possible to match a 
child to his/her mother only if that child is living in the same household as his/her mother.  Thus, 
we measure the number of children ages 18 and under who live in the household and not the 
number of previous births. 
After matching children to their mothers for the years 1989-1999, we confine our primary 
sample to those women who are most likely to meet AFDC eligibility requirements.  Therefore, 
we restrict our sample to single, less educated (i.e. high school graduate or less) females who 
have at least one previous child and who are between the ages of 15 and 45.  In some of the 
following analyses, however, we also include less-educated, married women with children as a 
comparison group.  The education-level restriction is imposed because the majority of welfare 
participants whose educational status is known have no more than a high school education 
(United States Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 1998). 
  To identify whether a woman has a birth in the survey year, we examine the age of her 
matched children.  If a woman has a child who is less than one year old, then we assume that that 
woman gave birth in the preceding year.
21  Because family cap policies aim to influence a 
woman's decision to have an additional out-of-wedlock child, we take the year and month of each 
observation and lag it 15 months.  The purpose of the time lag is to take into account the nine-
month interval between the decision to have a child (or at least the decision to use contraceptives) 
and the actual birth of the child.  We also add 6 months to this lag because it represents the 
midpoint over the previous year when the birth may have occurred. 
 
 
                                                           
21 Note, for example, that twins or two children born separately in the same 12-month period are not double 
counted.    17
4. Results 
TRENDS IN OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTH RATES 
Figure 1 displays birth rates for single, less educated mothers (ages 15-45) in family cap 
and non-family cap states for 1989 to 1998.  Birth rates among our sample of women show a 
downward trend over the ten-year time span from 1989 to 1998.  This is true for both family cap 
and non-family cap states.  From 1989 to 1991, birth rates increased in both family cap and non-
family cap states.  In family cap states, the birth rate climbed from 6.2% in 1989 to 8.6% in 1991.   
In non-family cap states, the birth rate increased from 6.5% in 1989 to a high of 7.4% in 1991.  
After 1991, the average birth rate of our sample of females in family cap states fell by over 2 
percentage points to 6.5% in 1992, and then bounced to its peak of 9% in 1993 before declining 
sharply to a low of 4.8% in 1994.
22  From 1994 to 1998, the birth rate in family cap states 
continued to fluctuate, though less dramatically, and ended the period lower than it was prior to 
1994.   The average birth rate in non-family cap states followed a smoother downward path 
declining from a high of 7.4% in 1991 to a low of 5.7% in 1994.  After 1994, the birth rate in 
non-family cap states increased moderately to 6.3% in 1997 and then falls to 6% in 1998. 
Overall, birth rates in the family cap states followed a pattern similar to those in non-
family cap states.  The data also indicate that birth rates in family cap states were generally higher 
than birth rates in non-family cap states from 1989 to 1993, whereas they were lower from 1994 
to 1998, suggesting that family cap policies may have been effective in lowering birth rates 
among single, less educated mothers. 
  Table 3 presents pre and post period out-of-wedlock birth rates for the family cap and 
non-family cap states in our analysis.  Comparing totals, we find that the birth rate for family cap 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
22 A possible explanation for this sharp decrease may be the changes to CPS variables during this same time 
period.  Several variables experienced significant changes or were discontinued after 1993.  However, we 
took considerable care to account for any changes in variables and to ensure consistency in matching 
mothers to children over the years.  
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states (7.3%) during the pre period was slightly higher than the birth rate for non-family cap 
states (6.9%).  In the post period, the birth rate decreased in both the family cap and non-family 
cap states.  The decrease in the birth rate was greater in family cap states (1.7 percentage points) 
than in non-family cap states (1.0 percentage point), suggesting that family cap policies may have 
reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates. 
Turning our attention to the Northeast, we find that New Jersey experienced a large 
decrease in its mean birth rate− 2.5 percentage points−while non-family cap states in the 
Northeast experienced a smaller decrease (1.1 percentage points) from the pre to post period.  
Focusing on Southern states, however, we find a very different pattern.  The birth rate in the 
Southern family cap states remained essentially the same over the pre to the post period while it 
decreased by 1.1 percentage points in the Southern non-family cap states.  Overall, these results 
provide evidence both supporting and contradicting the hypothesis that family cap policies 
reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates.  These results, however, are only suggestive.  We now need 
to control for changes in demographic characteristics. 
 
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY CAP POLICIES ON FERTILITY 
To control for the potential effects of differential trends in demographic characteristics, 
we estimate probit regressions for the probability of birth using our sample of single, less-
educated women with children.  Table 4 reports coefficient estimates, standard errors and 
marginal effects for Equation (2.1).
 23  The dependent variable equals one if the woman had a 
birth in the previous year and equals zero otherwise.  In addition to state and year fixed effects, a 
post-period dummy, unemployment rates, and maximum AFDC benefit levels, we include 
controls for several individual characteristics affecting fertility.  The coefficient estimates on 
these explanatory variables have the expected signs.  For example, we find that graduating from    19
high school, living with parents, and having more previous children (up to 3 children) decrease 
the probability of having a child.  We also find that younger, non-white and never married women 
have a higher probability of giving birth, all else equal. 
We now turn to the results for the family cap policies.  We first discuss estimates for 
Specification 1, which includes the full sample of family cap and non-family cap states.  The 
coefficient on the family cap state and post period interaction variable is positive and small in 
magnitude.
24  The point estimate implies that family cap policies increase the probability of birth 
by 0.41 percentage points.  The coefficient, however, is not statistically significant.  Although this 
estimate does not provide evidence that family cap policies reduce out-of-wedlock birth rates 
among single, less-educated mothers, we cannot rule out the possibility that negative effects exist.  
A 95 percent confidence interval for our point estimate would be -0.1175 to 0.1896.  Thus, we 
cannot with reasonable confidence rule out negative effects that are smaller in absolute value than  
-1.3 percentage points. 
In Specification 1, the family cap effect is identified by grouping all family cap states; 
however, there may exist some important differences across states.  In Specification 2, we interact 
each of the five family cap states with the post-period dummy variable.  This allows for the 
identification of separate family cap effects for the five states, which may be justified due to 
differences in incremental AFDC benefit levels and additional AFDC waivers.  Although none of 
the coefficients are statistically significant, we find both positive and negative coefficients.  The 
post-period interactions for Indiana and Virginia are negative, whereas the interactions are 
positive for Arkansas, Georgia and New Jersey. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 The marginal effect or average derivative equals δΣϕ(Zit'π)/NT, where δ is the coefficient on the family 
cap state/post-time period interaction variable, φ is the normal probability density function, Zit includes all 
independent variables, and NT is the total sample size. 
24 We also estimate this equation using a treatment group consisting of all states that implemented AFDC 
family cap waivers prior to TANF.   Thus, the treatment group includes New Jersey, Georgia, Arkansas, 
Virginia, Indiana, Delaware, Mississippi, Arizona, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Illinois, Connecticut, 
Wisconsin, Maryland, North Carolina, and California.  The estimated effect of the family cap is small, 
positive and statistically insignificant, similar to that in our original regression with only five family cap 
states in the treatment group (the coefficient and standard error are 0.006 and 0.0583, respectively).    20
To check the robustness of the unexpected positive coefficients for Arkansas, Georgia, 
and New Jersey, we conduct separate analyses for the South and Northeast.  In Specification 3, 
we only include family cap and non-family cap states in the South.  By focusing on the South, we 
are limiting our comparison group of states to those that are more similar to Arkansas, Georgia 
and Virginia.  We find a positive, although statistically insignificant, coefficient on the family cap 
state and post-period interaction variable.  This is consistent with a weighted average of the 
positive coefficients found for Arkansas and Georgia and the negative coefficient found for 
Virginia in the previous specification.  In fact, the inclusion of only Southern non-family cap 
states in the comparison group makes little difference to the coefficient estimates.  In 
Specification 4, we include separate post-period interactions for Arkansas, Georgia and Virginia.  
We find very similar coefficient estimates on these post-period interactions as those reported in 
Specification 2, which use all non-family cap states in the United States as the comparison group. 
We also conduct a separate analysis for New Jersey.  As noted above, New Jersey was 
the first state to implement a family cap policy, and, thus, received a lot of attention.  To create a 
more appropriate comparison group, we select only non-family cap states in the Northeast.  
Although the coefficient is now negative, it remains statistically insignificant.
25  Therefore, 
estimates using only Northeastern states as a comparison group for New Jersey do not provide 
evidence suggesting that we change our conclusions regarding the effects of the family cap in this 
state. 
   Overall, the results presented in Table 4 do not provide evidence that family cap policies 
have a negative effect on out-of-wedlock birth rates (although confidence intervals for our point 
estimates do not allow us to rule out negative effects).  All of the estimated coefficients on the 
family cap state and post-period interactions are statistically insignificant and many of them are 
                                                           
 
25 We also estimate a probit regression including only Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania as 
comparison states.  The coefficient estimate on the New Jersey*Post Period interaction variable is -0.0964 
and the standard error is 0.1057.    21
positive.  It is important to note that our results do not vary much from those of the formal 
experimental evaluations of New Jersey’s and Arkansas’ family cap waivers.  These evaluations 
do not provide strong evidence of a negative effect on fertility.  Interestingly, our analysis, which 
uses multiple comparison groups and data from a source less susceptible to contamination bias, 
also does not provide evidence that family caps were effective in reducing out-of-wedlock births. 
As noted above, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia implemented additional 
waivers at the same time as their family cap policies.  Therefore, our estimated effects of family 
cap policies for these states may include the effects of other waivers.  We argue, however, that the 
concurrent implementation of these waivers should not change our conclusions regarding the 
effects of the family cap policy.  First, the family cap was the only AFDC waiver that specifically 
targeted childbearing incentives.  The family cap explicitly denied additional benefits to women 
having children while receiving AFDC, whereas the other waivers implemented by these states -- 
time limits (Indiana and Virginia), JOBS sanctions (Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia), 
changes to JOBS work exemptions (Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia), work requirement time 
limit (Virginia), and increased earnings disregards (Virginia) -- generally created incentives to 
work and/or leave the AFDC rolls.  Furthermore, the AFDC-UP waiver in Indiana may have 
reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates indirectly by increasing the probability of marriage.  We 
discuss the broader issue of how marriage may affect our results below.  Although these policies 
may have indirectly affected the fertility decisions of AFDC recipients, their effects should have 
been small relative to the effects of family cap policies. 
  Second, and perhaps more importantly, if the waivers had an effect, their effects 
generally should be negative, which is the same as the hypothesized effect of the family cap.
26  
Our estimates do not provide evidence that the implementation of family cap policies and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
26 As noted above, the increased earnings disregard may have increased non-marital fertility by expanding 
eligibility for welfare.  The hypothesized positive effect of this policy, especially when combined with the 
family cap, is unlikely, however, as the opportunity cost of having an additional child on welfare is large.    22
other aforementioned waivers had a negative effect on the incidence of out-of-wedlock births.  
Therefore, we conclude that our estimates do not provide evidence that family caps affected 
fertility.  We also should note that the one family cap state that did not implement additional 
waivers -- Arkansas -- had a positive (although statistically insignificant) coefficient on the post 
period-family cap interaction variable. 
  We estimated two additional regressions to further explore these issues.  First, we 
estimated a regression which included all possible control states.  This modified control group 
includes states that also implemented non-family cap welfare waivers in addition to our previous 
control states.  The coefficient on the family cap post variable remains very small and statistically 
insignificant (the coefficient and standard error are -0.0081 and 0.0749, respectively). 
  We also estimated a specification that includes all states and incorporates waiver 
controls.  The experimental group now includes all states implementing a family cap and the 
control group includes all other states.  We include dummy variables for each of the major AFDC 
waivers (i.e. family caps, termination/reduction time limits, changes to JOBS work exemptions, 
changes to JOBS sanctions, increases in earnings disregards, and work requirement time limits, 
Crouse 1999).  We continue to exclude post-TANF observations for all states.  The results 
generally support our assertions regarding the other AFDC waivers.  The estimated coefficients 
on the AFDC waiver dummy variables are small and not statistically significant.  The only 
exception is that we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the work 
requirement time limits dummy variable.  We should note, however, that work requirement time 
limits were usually implemented at the same time as the other work-related waivers and our 
estimates are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of a couple of outlier states.  It is important to 
also note that in our main specifications reported above the only experimental state that 
implemented a work requirement time limit is Virginia and none of the control states 
implemented any waivers.  Furthermore, the estimated coefficient on the family cap waiver 
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dummy remains small and statistically insignificant (the coefficient and standard error are -
0.0117 and 0.0639, respectively).  Therefore, the inclusion of wavier controls and additional 
states does not change our main conclusion regarding the effects of family caps. 
 
DIFFERENTIAL TIME TRENDS 
A problem arises with the preceding interpretation of the "difference–in-differences" 
estimates if family cap and non-family cap states had differential underlying trends in out-of-
wedlock birth rates during the 1990s.  These trends may have "washed out" the observed effects 
of family cap policies.  To address these concerns, we estimate probit regressions that include 
separate time trends for family cap and non-family cap states.  Table 5 reports estimates for 
Equation (2.2), which includes a linear time trend interacted with family cap states.  The main 
time trend is captured in the year fixed effects.  The coefficient estimates on the family cap-time 
trend interactions in all three specifications are small and statistically insignificant, and thus do 
not provide evidence that family cap states experienced a different trend in out-of-wedlock birth 
rates. 
In Table 5, Specification 1 includes the full sample of family cap and non-family cap 
states.  The estimated coefficient on the family cap state and post period interaction variable is 
small, negative and statistically insignificant.  Specification 2 focuses on family cap and non-
family cap states in the South.  As before, the coefficient on the family cap state and post period 
interaction is positive and insignificant.  The results for Specification 3, which includes only New 
Jersey and non-family cap states in the Northeast, are interesting in terms of the magnitude of the 
estimated effect of New Jersey’s family cap policy.  The coefficient on the New Jersey and post-
period interaction variable is negative and large in magnitude.  Although statistically 
insignificant, the point estimate implies that New Jersey’s family cap policy decreased the 
probability of out-of-wedlock births among single, less educated mothers by 3.25 percentage 
points.    24
Again, the lack of statistical significance weakens any inferences from these results.  
Nevertheless, the estimates do not provide any evidence suggesting that family caps reduced 
fertility. 
The findings from Table 5 also provide some suggestive evidence on the question of 
whether the family cap policies implemented in our sample of states were in response to upward 
trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates, and thus represent an endogenous policy intervention.  As 
noted above, however, we do not find evidence indicating that family cap and non-family cap 
states experienced a differential time trend in fertility.  To investigate this further, we ran a 
second set of regressions with time trend interactions excluding observations from the post family 
cap period for both family cap states and control states.  If family caps were implemented in 
response to trends in fertility then we should find an upward trend in out-of-wedlock birth rates in 
family cap states relative to the trend in non-family cap states.  We find a small, positive, but 
statistically insignificant coefficient on the family cap state and time trend interactions in the 
U.S., South, and Northeast specifications.  Although we cannot rule out the possibility that family 
caps were implemented as a reaction to fertility trends among welfare recipients, our estimates do 
not provide evidence suggesting that this is the case. 
 
ESTIMATES USING MARRIED WOMEN AS A CONTROL GROUP 
  In order to further examine the effectiveness of the family cap, we estimate probit 
regressions for the probability of birth using married, less educated women with children as the 
comparison group (Equation (2.3)).  We restrict our sample to only family cap states in order to 
compare trends in birth rates between less educated single and married women with children.  In 
theory, married women should not be affected (or at least only minimally affected) by family cap 
policies because they typically are not eligible to receive AFDC benefits; however, they may be    25
affected similarly by other factors affecting fertility among low-income women.
27  Thus, the 
coefficient of interest in Equation (2.3) corresponds to the single woman and post period 
interaction variable. 
  Table 6 reports estimates for Equation (2.3). As expected, single women have lower birth 
rates relative to married women, all else equal.  The results for family cap policies are as follows.  
In Specification 1, we include all five family cap states in our sample.  We find a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of single woman and post period.  The point 
estimate implies that family caps decrease the probability of birth by 1.6 percentage points.  
Restricting our sample to family cap states in the South (Specification 2), we find a positive, 
although insignificant, coefficient on the single woman and post period interaction.  In 
Specification 3 we focus on New Jersey.  The estimated coefficient on the interaction of single 
woman and post period is negative and large in magnitude.  The coefficient, however, is 
statistically insignificant. 
The use of less-educated married women with children as a comparison group provides 
some evidence that family caps decrease fertility among single mothers.  The evidence, however, 
only comes from one of the reported specifications. 
  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES 
  Expanding on the difference-in-differences strategy for estimating the effectiveness of 
family cap policies, we combine Equations (2.1) and (2.3) to compare changes over time in the 
difference between the birth rates of single and married women in family cap states to changes 
over time in the difference between the corresponding birth rates in non-family cap states.  
                                                           
27 To further investigate this assumption we estimated two regressions.  First, we estimated a probit 
regression in which we included a linear time trend interacted with a dummy variable for single mothers 
using the entire period for control states and the pre-period for family cap states.  We do not find evidence 
of different trends in fertility between single and married women with children.  We also estimated a 
regression in which we only included family cap states and similarly found no evidence of differential 
trends in fertility between single and married mothers before the implementation of family caps.    26
Family cap policies should primarily affect the fertility decisions of single women with children 
who live in family cap states during the post-family cap period.  As identified in Equation (2.4), 
we employ a "difference-in-difference-in-differences" estimator to test this hypothesis.  
Table 7 reports estimates for Equation (2.4).   The results for the family cap policies are 
embodied in the estimated coefficients for the triple interaction variable of single woman, family 
cap state, and post period.  Specification 1 includes the full sample of married and single women 
in family cap and non-family cap states.  The coefficient on the triple interaction variable is 
negative; however, it also is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.   In Specification 2, 
we include only single and married mothers who live in family cap and non-family cap states in 
the South.  The estimated coefficient on the triple interaction variable is large and positive, 
although statistically insignificant.  Estimating Equation (2.4) including only observations from 
New Jersey and other Northeastern states (Specification 3), we find a negative, but statistically 
insignificant coefficient on the triple interaction variable. 
The results of the "difference-in-difference-in-differences” estimator do not differ 
qualitatively from the results reported in Table 4.  In all specifications, we find statistically 
insignificant coefficients, and thus do not find evidence that family caps reduced fertility.  These 
results also are consistent with those of Joyce, et al. (2003) who use state-level data aggregated 
from induced termination of pregnancy files, national nativity files, and the Current Population 
Survey and do not find consistent evidence suggesting that family caps affect birth and abortion 
rates.  Interestingly, their sample does not include New Jersey and Georgia and uses a different 
identification strategy for their difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator.  They compare 
changes in birth rates for less-educated single mothers to changes in birth rates for less-educated 
single women without children. 
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FAMILY CAPS AND MARRIAGE 
One concern with these results and those reported above is that family caps, or possibly 
the waivers implemented with them, may affect the opportunity costs of marriage.  This may have 
an indirect effect on estimates of the impacts of family caps on out-of-wedlock birth rates by 
changing the sample composition of single woman with children.  In particular, a single mother 
may be more likely to marry the father of her child with the implementation of family caps 
because the penalty of marriage is now lower. 
We investigate this issue further by estimating two regressions.  First, we estimate a 
regression that includes both less-educated, single and married women with children in the 
sample, but excludes the interactions between single women, and family cap states, the post 
period and family cap state*post period.  Thus, the family cap effect is identified by a comparison 
of the change in birth rates among single and married mothers in family cap states and the change 
in the birth rates among single and married mothers in non-family cap states.  If family caps 
influence the likelihood of marriage it will have no effect on the estimates because single and 
married mothers are grouped together.  The coefficient estimate on the modified family cap 
state/post period interaction is positive (0.0521) and statistically insignificant. 
We also directly investigated the hypothesis of whether family caps affect marriage.  
Specifically, we estimated a regression in which the dependent variable is the probability of 
marriage using our sample of less-educated, single and married women with children.  We 
included an interaction between family cap states and the post period.  We find a very small and 
statistically insignificant coefficient on this interaction.  Therefore, the estimates do not provide 
evidence that family caps affected the probability of marriage among less-educated women with 
children. 
Perhaps these results are not entirely surprising.  Although family caps may lower the 
opportunity costs of getting married to the father of the child, they are small relative to the total    28
AFDC benefit.  Thus, the main opportunity cost of marriage will be the potential loss of the chief 
component of the AFDC benefit that the woman currently is receiving. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We use microdata from the 1989 to 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing 
Rotation Group (ORG) files to examine trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates among single, less-
educated women with children prior to the implementation of state TANF programs.  In 
particular, we compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates in the first five states to implement 
family cap policies -- Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia -- to trends in several 
sets of comparison states that did not implement family caps or other waivers during our sample 
period.  In simple comparisons of trends in birth rates, we find that Indiana, New Jersey, and 
Virginia experienced larger declines in out-of-wedlock birth rates after the implementation of 
family cap policies than the relevant comparison group of non-family cap states.  We also find, 
however, that Arkansas and Georgia experienced large increases in out-of-wedlock birth rates 
over the same period in which a group of comparison states from the South experienced a large 
decline in out-of-wedlock birth rates. 
In our first set of probit regressions for the probability of a birth among single, less-
educated women with children, we do not find evidence that family cap polices have a negative 
effect on fertility.  All of the estimated coefficients for the variable embodying the effect of the 
family cap policy are statistically insignificant and many of them are positive.  Furthermore, even 
after controlling for differential time trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates between family cap and 
non-family cap states, we continue to find a lack of statistical significance as well as a positive 
coefficient for the Southern family cap states.  We should note, however, that confidence 
intervals for the point estimates cannot rule out negative effects. 
In the next set of probit regressions, we compare trends in birth rates between single and 
married mothers in family cap states.  Thus, we use less-educated, married women with children    29
in family cap states instead of less-educated, single mothers in non-family cap states as the 
comparison group.  Although we use a different source of variation to identify the effects of 
family cap policies, we find somewhat similar results.  The important exception is that we find a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient in the full specification providing some evidence 
that family caps reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates. 
In our final set of probit regressions, we compare changes over time in the difference 
between the birth rates of single and married women in family cap states to changes over time in 
the difference between the birth rates of single and married women in non-family cap states.  
Using this "difference-in-difference-in-differences" estimator, we do not find evidence that 
family cap polices reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock births among single, less-educated 
women with children. 
With the exception of Arkansas, our "family cap" states implemented additional waivers 
that may have affected fertility.  We argue, however, that the implementation of these other 
waiver policies in Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia does not change our conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of family cap policies in reducing out-of-wedlock births in these 
states.  This is because we do not expect the additional waivers to have a large negative effect on 
fertility, and, similar to the family cap, these other AFDC waivers aimed to encourage self-
sufficiency among welfare recipients (DHHS, 1997).  We also do not find evidence of a family 
cap effect when experimenting with controls for other waivers and using larger samples of 
experimental and control states.  Thus, our general lack of evidence of a negative effect of the 
family cap and other waivers on fertility implies that our findings do not support the hypothesis 
that family cap policies reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock births. 
In general, our estimates do not provide evidence that family cap policies reduce out-of-
wedlock birth rates among single, less-educated women with children.  The effects of family cap 
policies on fertility may be limited because incremental benefit levels are substantially lower than 
the estimated costs of raising a child, many welfare spells are short, the importance of non-   30
pecuniary factors, the unanticipated nature of some pregnancies, and the partial offsetting of lost 
benefits from Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits.
28  If policymakers aim to reduce fertility among 
welfare recipients, relying on family caps as the policy tool may not produce the desired results.  
It remains to be seen, however, if the changes implemented under TANF will have larger effects 
on out-of-wedlock birth rates.
                                                           
 
28 See Haveman and Wolfe (1995), Anderson (1989), Bane and Ellwood (1994), Zelnik and Kantner 
(1980), and Maynard, et al (1998) for evidence.    31
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New Jersey Oct-92 X
Georgia Jan-94 X
Arkansas Jul-94 X
Indiana May-95 X
Virginia Jul-95 X
Delaware Oct-95 X
Mississippi Oct-95 X
Arizona Nov-95 X
Massachusetts Nov-95 X
Nebraska Nov-95 X
Illinois Dec-95 X
Connecticut Jan-96 X
Wisconsin* Jan-96 X
Maryland Mar-96 X
North Carolina Jul-96 X
Tennessee Sep-96 X
Florida Oct-96 X
Oklahoma Oct-96 X
South Carolina Oct-96 X
Wyoming Feb-97 X
Idaho* Jul-97 X
California Aug-97 X
North Dakota Jul-98 X
(1) The Urban Institute (May 1998).  "One Year After Federal Welfare Reform:  A Description 
     of State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Decisions as of October 1997."
(2) State of Wyoming Department of Family Services
*Idaho and Wisconsin have flat benefit structures under their TANF plans, resulting in an implicit family 
cap.
Table 1
States with Family Cap Policies as of 1998
In Order of Implementation Date
Sources:  
Family Cap
Implementation DateState 1992 1996 % Change 1992 1996 % Change 1992 1996 % Change
Family Cap States
Arkansas 204 182 -11% 8 6 -25% 7.2 5.4 -25%
Georgia 280 249 -11% 55 41 -25% 6.9 4.6 -33%
Indiana 288 256 -11% 19 16 -16% 6.5 4.1 -37%
New Jersey 424 377 -11% 88 94 7% 8.4 6.2 -26%
Virginia 354 315 -11% 64 57 -11% 6.4 4.4 -31%
Non-Cap States
Northeast
Connecticut 680 566 -17% 43 40 -7% 7.5 5.7 -24%
Maine 453 372 -18% 17 16 -6% 7.1 5.1 -28%
Massachusetts 539 503 -7% 64 51 -20% 8.5 4.3 -49%
New Hampshire 516 490 -5% 16 16 0% 7.5 4.2 -44%
New York* 640 570 -11% 289 266 -8% 8.5 6.2 -27%
Pennsylvania 421 375 -11% 81 61 -25% 7.5 5.3 -29%
Rhode Island 554 493 -11% 6 5 -17% 8.9 5.1 -43%
South
Alabama $149 $146 -2% 20 14 -30% 7.3 5.1 -30%
District of Columbia 409 374 -9% 15 18 20% 8.4 8.5 1%
Kentucky 228 233 2% 9 8 -11% 6.9 5.6 -19%
Louisiana 190 169 -11% 17 15 -12% 8.1 6.7 -17%
Maryland 377 332 -12% 51 47 -8% 6.6 4.9 -26%
North Carolina 272 242 -11% 86 59 -31% 5.9 4.3 -27%
Oklahoma 341 273 -20% 11 11 0% 5.7 4.1 -28%
South Carolina 210 178 -15% 18 14 -22% 6.2 6.0 -3%
Tennessee 185 165 -11% 33 20 -39% 6.4 5.2 -19%
Texas 184 167 -9% 79 64 -19% 7.5 5.6 -25%
West Virginia 249 225 -10% 5 4 -20% 11.3 7.5 -34%
Other Non-Cap States
Alaska 924 821 -11% 13 8 -38% 9.1 7.8 -14%
Hawaii 666 634 -5% 52 44 -15% 4.5 6.4 42%
Idaho 315 282 -10% 9 7 -22% 6.5 5.2 -20%
Kansas 422 382 -10% 15 10 -33% 4.2 4.5 7%
Montana 390 378 -3% 12 11 -8% 6.7 5.3 -21%
Nevada 372 310 -17% 17 14 -18% 6.6 5.4 -18%
New Mexico 324 346 7% 20 13 -35% 6.8 8.1 19%
North Dakota 401 384 -4% 1 1 0% 4.9 3.1 -37%
Ohio 334 303 -9% 45 37 -18% 7.2 4.9 -32%
Washington 531 486 -8% 65 57 -12% 7.5 6.5 -13%
Sources: 
(1) Henshaw, Stanley K. (1998), "Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States, 1995-1996,"  Family Planning Perspectives 30, pp. 263-270 & 287.
(2) 1998 "Greenbook," U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means
(3) 1998 and 1994 "Statistical Abstract of the United States," U.S. Census Bureau
*Average of benefits in New York City and Suffolk County
AFDC Benefit Levels Abortion Providers Unemployment Rate
Table 2
Selected State Characteristics (1992 and 1996)Birth Rate
Sample 
Size Birth Rate
Sample 
Size
Post-Pre 
(Difference)
Family Cap States
Arkansas 6.8% 659 7.9% 324 1.1%
Georgia 6.6% 897 7.6% 234 1.0%
Virginia 6.0% 831 3.1% 154 -3.0%
South Total 6.4% 2,387 6.7% 712 0.3%
Indiana 9.2% 790 2.2% 94 -7.1%
New Jersey 7.5% 1,405 5.0% 1,086 -2.5%
Total 7.3% 4,582 5.5% 1,892 -1.7%
Non-Cap States
South 6.9% 12,180 5.8% 2,143 -1.1%
Northeast 6.9% 6,628 5.8% 5,749 -1.1%
Total 6.9% 27,674 5.8% 7,455 -1.0%
Notes:  (1) The sample consists of single, less educated women with children (ages 15-45).
(2) All estimates use sample weights provided by the CPS.
Pre Period Post Period
Table 3
Comparison of Birth Rates in Family Cap and Non-Family Cap States(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample U.S. U.S. South South Northeast
Age 0.0165 0.0167 -0.0257 -0.0250 0.0376
(0.0132) (0.0152) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0250)
[0.0019] [0.0019] [-0.0030] [-0.0029] [0.0042]
Age Squared -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0016
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
[-0.0001] [-0.0002] [-0.0001] [-0.0001] [-0.0002]
Black 0.2185 0.2194 0.2419 0.2433 0.1956
(0.0253) (0.0275) (0.0417) (0.0418) (0.0455)
[0.0250] [0.0251] [0.0279] [0.0280] [0.0218]
Hispanic 0.1558 0.1563 0.2708 0.2696 0.1238
(0.0445) (0.0367) (0.0704) (0.0703) (0.0510)
[0.0178] [0.0179] [0.0312] [0.0310] [0.0138]
Asian 0.2333 0.232 0.2509 0.2435 0.2897
(0.0960) (0.1046) (0.2370) (0.2379) (0.1583)
[0.0267] [0.0266] [0.0289] [0.0280] [0.0323]
Native American 0.3315 0.332 0.2452 0.2445 -0.1472
(0.0826) (0.0641) (0.1499) (0.1500) (0.2875)
[0.0380] [0.0380] [0.0282] [0.0281] [-0.0164]
Never Married 0.0501 0.0502 0.0285 0.0285 0.0601
(0.0208) (0.0253) (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0423)
[0.0057] [0.0057] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0067]
High School Graduate -0.1852 -0.1851 -0.1418 -0.1424 -0.2152
(0.0243) (0.0217) (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0370)
[-0.0212] [-0.0212] [-0.0163] [-0.0164] [-0.0240]
Number of Previous -0.1661 -0.1666 -0.1081 -0.1095 -0.1958
Children (0.0300) (0.0281) 0.0414 (0.0415) (0.0502)
[-0.0190] [-0.0191] [-0.0124] [-0.0126] [-0.0219]
Number of Previous 0.0258 0.0258 0.0177 0.0178 0.0273
Children Squared (0.0046) (0.0045) 0.0065 (0.0065) (0.0084)
[0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0030]
Live with Parents -0.2161 -0.2154 -0.1758 -0.1759 -0.2324
(0.0259) (0.0294) (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0514)
[-0.0247] [-0.0247] [-0.0202] [-0.0202] [-0.0259]
(continued)
Table 4
Probit Regressions for Probability of Out-of-Wedlock Birth
Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1989-1999)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family Cap State*Post 0.0360
Period (0.0784)
[0.0041]
Arkansas*Post Period 0.1838 0.2237
(0.1392) (0.1524)
[0.0210] [0.0257]
Georgia*Post Period 0.2489 0.2767
(0.1532) (0.1605)
[0.0285] [0.0318]
Indiana*Post Period -0.4929
(0.3356)
[-0.0564]
New Jersey*Post Period 0.0163 -0.0608
(0.1021) (0.0991)
[0.0019] [-0.0068]
Virginia*Post Period -0.2895 -0.2666
(0.2256) (0.2318)
[-0.0331] [-0.0307]
Southern Family Cap 0.1439
State *Post Period (0.1071)
[0.0166]
Sample Birth Rate 0.0654 0.0654 0.0662 0.0662 0.0627
Sample Size 41,612 41,612 17,427 17,427 14,869
Log Likelihood -8,922.62 -8,918.10 -3,754.99 -3,752.53 -3,116.79
Notes:  (1) The sample consists of single, less educated women with children (ages 15-45).
(2) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman has a birth in the previous year.    
(3) Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, and probability 
derivatives (marginal effects) are in brackets below the standard errors.  (4) Each equation 
includes state and year fixed effects, post-period dummy, unemployment rates, and 
maximum AFDC benefit levels.
Table 4
(continued)(1) (2) (3)
Sample U.S. South Northeast
Family Cap State*Time Trend 0.0166 0.0314 0.0616
(0.0259) (0.0261) (0.0408)
[0.0019] [0.0036] [0.0069]
Family Cap State*Post Period -0.0334 0.0185 -0.2914
(0.1558) (0.1484) (0.1843)
[-0.0038] [0.0021] [-0.0325]
Sample Birth Rate 0.0655 0.0662 0.0627
Sample Size 41,612 17,427 14,869
Log Likelihood -8,922.27 -3,754.27 -3,115.65
Notes:  (1) The sample consists of single, less educated women with children (ages 15-45).
(2) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman has a birth in the previous year.    
(3) Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, and probability 
derivatives (marginal effects) are in brackets below the standard errors.  (4) Each equation 
includes all controls used in Table 4.
Table 5
Probit Regressions for Probability of Out-of-Wedlock Birth including Time Trends
Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1989-1999)(1) (2) (3)
Sample
AR, GA, IN, 
NJ, VA AR, GA, VA NJ
Single Woman -0.2084 -0.1915 -0.2632
(0.0500) (0.0713) (0.0907)
[-0.0227] [-0.0200] [-0.0296]
Single Woman*Post Period -0.1443 0.0316 -0.1738
(0.0733) (0.1127) (0.1069)
[-0.0157] [0.0033] [-0.0195]
Sample Birth Rate 0.0625 0.0597 0.0650
Sample Size 20,429 9,836 7,491
Log Likelihood -4,164.04 -1,927.15 -1,575.77
Notes:  (1) The sample consists of single and married, less educated women with 
children (ages 15-45).  (2) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman has 
a birth in the previous year.  (3) Standard errors are in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates, and probability derivatives (marginal effects) are in brackets 
below the standard errors.  (4) Each equation includes all controls used in Table 4.
Table 6
Probit Regressions for Probability of Birth including Married Women
Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1989-1999)(1) (2) (3)
Sample U.S. South Northeast
Single Woman -0.2396 -0.1637 -0.2996
(0.0243) (0.0311) (0.0347)
[-0.0267] [-0.0177] [-0.0338]
Single Woman*Post Period -0.0609 -0.1306 -0.0334
(0.0393) (0.0582) (0.0583)
[-0.0068] [-0.0141] [-0.0038]
Single Woman*Family Cap State 0.0368 -0.0057 0.0228
(0.0423) (0.0582) (0.0716)
[0.0041] [-0.0006] [0.0026]
Family Cap State*Post Period 0.0874 -0.0234 0.1495
(0.0499) (0.0782) (0.0764)
[0.0097] [-0.0025] [0.0169]
Single*Family Cap State*Post Period -0.0771 0.1590 -0.1413
(0.0786) (0.1269) (0.1220)
[-0.0086] [0.0172] [-0.0160]
Sample Birth Rate 0.0648 0.0626 0.0651
Sample Size 131,796 52,672 44,820
Log Likelihood -27,484.82 -10,641.75 -9,467.74
Notes:  (1) The sample consists of single and married, less educated women with children (ages 15-45).
(2) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman has a birth in the previous year.    
(3) Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, and probability 
derivatives (marginal effects) are in brackets below the standard errors.  (4) Each equation 
includes state and year fixed effects.
Table 7
Probit Regressions for Probability of Birth including Married Women
Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1989-1999)